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This paper assesses the ramifications of the Cabinet Social Policy Committees 
proposals contained in the paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006. The 
Committee proposed a change to s 106 of the Evidence Act, which currently lies 
in favour of full disclosure of video evidence to the defence. The proposed 
amendments will reverse this presumption, ultimately restricting the defence’s 
access to the complainants video evidence. This paper will assess the validity and 
practicality of these proposed amendments, by assessing whether they are 
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the equality of arms doctrine 
and international case law. Although the proposed amendments were made to 
protect vulnerable complainants, attrition rates in New Zealand show that 
vulnerable witnesses do not drop out of the criminal justice system just because 
they are fearful about their video evidence being disclosed. The attrition rates are 
more complex. However, this paper argues that there are still adequate safeguards 
in place to protect the defence’s right to a fair trial. Whilst these safeguards 
holdfast, any effort to protect vulnerable victims should be encouraged.  
 
II Key words 
 










III Introduction: The method of disclosure of video evidence.  
 
Video record evidence is allowed to children and vulnerable adults who wish to 
give their evidence in chief at trial. Section 106 of the Evidence Act 2006 allows 
for vulnerable witnesses to give their evidence via video record, by recording the 
witness’s forensic interview.1 Under s 106(4) of the Evidence Act 2006, all video 
record evidence that is to be offered in court as an alternative form of evidence 
must be disclosed to the defence lawyer before being offered as evidence.2 This 
provision has captured the attention of the Cabinet Social Policy Committee who, 
in 2013, proposed a change in the method of disclosure regarding video evidence.3 
Currently, there is a presumption in favour of disclosure of the video evidence to 
the defence. Section 106(3) supports this presumption by stating: 
 
A video record that is to be offered as an alternative way of giving 
evidence in a proceeding must be offered for viewing by all parties or 
their lawyers before it is offered in evidence, unless the Judge directs 
otherwise.4  
 
The Cabinet Social Policy Committee propose to reverse the presumption. The 
proposals aim to restrict defence access to the video evidence of a complainant, 
who has been a victim of sexual or serious offending, by only providing defence 
counsel with a transcript of the interview. If the defence wish to access the video 
evidence physically, then under the proposed changes, they will have to view it on 
                                                 
1 Evidence Act 2006, s 106.  
2 At s 106(4)(a).  
3 Cabinet Social Policy Committee “Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006” (12 November 2013) at [50]. 
4 Section 106(3).  
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police premises (or at another premises agreed to by the parties) or apply to the 
court for the release of a copy, under the proposed changes.5 
 
This paper will assess the possible effects of the proposed changes to s 106, 
examining both the positive and negative ramifications for vulnerable victims. 
Ultimately, this paper argues in favour of the proposed amendments. Although the 
defence’s access to video evidence would be restricted, safeguards exist to protect 
the fair trial process. The defence can still view the video evidence on police 
premises, and can apply to the judge for a copy. Imaginably, the judge would 
allow the defence a copy of the complainant’s video evidence in the appropriate 
circumstances; perhaps when it would threaten the defence’s right to a fair trial.  
 
This paper also evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed amendments. Attrition 
rates show that vulnerable complainants drop out of the criminal justice system 
for a number of reasons, proving that this is a wider problem. Not all witnesses 
who drop out do so because they are concerned with their video evidence being in 
the hands of the defence.  
 
Nonetheless, the marginal difference these proposals could make outweigh the 
detriment to the defence. The amount of vulnerable witnesses the proposed 
amendments catch may be less than what Cabinet hoped for, but it is a reform that 
needs to happen. Additionally, the amendments do not necessarily take rights 
away from the defendants, because they still have reasonable access to the 
complainant’s video evidence.  
 
                                                 
5 Cabinet Social Policy Committee “Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006” (12 November 2013) at [50]. 
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Before assessing the implications of the proposed reforms offered by Cabinet, the 
current operation of s 106 will be discussed, along with what is required to trigger 
s 106. The case of R v Henning6 discusses the functions of s 106 and 
simultaneously presents the police’s viewpoint regarding the operation of s 106, 
particularly their skepticism on video evidence being accessed by the defence. 
Henning is the most well-known case concerning video evidence and s 106, and 
has acted as a catalyst for statutory reform.7 Doctrinal issues also arise upon 
consideration of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the principle of a fair 
trial and the principle of equality of arms. Prima facie, Cabinet’s proposed 
amendments to restrict the defences access to video records conflict with these 
doctrines. But upon closer analysis, the notion of a fair trial and equality of arms 
are subject to change, and are flexible in nature. Therefore, they are subject to a 
factual analysis, which ultimately decides what a fair trial is. Additionally, the 
Canadian case of R v O’Connor8 offers a point of comparison to the New Zealand 
system, whilst analyzing the practicalities of the amendments helps identify the 
misconceptions of Cabinet in drafting the proposed amendments.  
 
IV The nature and form of video evidence 
 
Pre-recording video evidence is a method of information gathering used to 
preserve information given by complainants, and simultaneously protect them 
from the harsh reality of the adversarial system. Video evidence is able to capture 
                                                 
6 R v Henning, DC Wellington CRI-2010-078-1159, 5 July 2011. 
7 Yvette Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald “Evidence Issues” in Yvette Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald (eds) From 
“Real Rape” to Real Justice: Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011) 123. 
8 R. v. O'Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
Zoe Bennett  LAWS489 
7 
the complainant’s entire evidence, which arguably improves the likelihood of a 
just outcome by giving the police, and later the jury, a broader picture of the case.9 
 
Recording the complainant’s initial interview with the police allows the police to 
exercise the cognitive interviewing technique. This technique encourages police to 
‘sit back’ and allow the complainant to report everything they remember about the 
event, including the surrounding circumstances and how they felt at the time.10 
Research regarding the techniques effectiveness have been positive, with one 
study reporting that the cognitive interviewing technique increased the recall of 
information by 30-35% for adult witnesses.11  
 
The Court of Appeal held in M v R12 that in exceptional cases, the court has the 
jurisdiction to make an order for the pre-trial recording of cross-examination. In 
exercising this power, the court must carefully balance the benefits to the witness 
against the disadvantages to the defendant.13 The Court listed numerous reasons 
why, in non-compelling cases, the disadvantages outweigh the benefits. 
Complainants could end up giving evidence twice if new issues arose during trial, 
which frustrates the purpose of reducing the witnesses time in the criminal justice 
system. Ordering a pre-trial recording of cross-examination was seen to limit the 
jury’s ability to assess the defendant’s credibility and to see the defendant’s 
reaction to evidence. The court was also concerned about the defendant not 
hearing the prosecutions opening before cross-examination. Generally, the 
                                                 
9 Nina Westera, Mark Kebbell and Becky Milne “Losing two thirds of the story: A comparison of the video recorded 
police interview and live evidence of rape complainants” (2013) 4 Criminal Law Review 290. 
10 Mary Schollum “Investigative interviewing: The Literature” (2005) New Zealand Police, Wellington. 
11 Mark Kebbell, Becky Milne, and Graham Wagstaff “The cognitive interview: a survey of its forensic effectiveness” 
(1999) 5 Psychology, Crime and Law 101. 
12 M v R [2011] NZCA 303. 
13 At 12. 
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defendant is entitled to hear the charges against them.14 Finally, parties would 
have to pay more for legal services, as counsel for both parties would have to 
prepare for the pre-recording of the evidence as well as the actual trial.15 
 
Despite challenges from the defence bar, many benefits are reaped from pre-
recording all or a portion of the complainant’s evidence. Although this piece is 
primarily concerned with the complainant’s evidential interview that is recorded 
initially by police, the overall concerns and effects of pre-recording video 
evidence remain relevant. Pre-recording evidence is a valuable, and somewhat 
dangerous tool. It can preserve evidence, speed up the complainant’s time in the 
criminal justice system, and protect vulnerable complainants from the harsh 
reality of the courtroom.  
 
A Prior to s 106 being engaged 
 
Before s 106(4) is activated, s 103 of the Evidence Act regulates the use of 
alternative ways for witnesses to give evidence in criminal proceedings. Judges 
can direct a witness to give evidence in a certain way, such as pre-recording an 
evidential interview for evidence in chief, as provided in s 105. What activates s 
103 is the presence of vulnerability, youth, maturity (or lack of), fear, or a close 
relationship between the complainant and the defendant.16 Additionally, the judge 
must consider the fairness of the proceedings, and the potential impact, it could 
have on the witness, if an alternative form of evidence giving were to be 
                                                 
14 M v R, above n 12. 
15 M v R, above n 12. 
16 Evidence Act 2006, s 106.   
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allowed.17 Since 2006, adult complainants have been recognized as a class of 
persons who need more access to other forms of evidence giving, in a greater 
drive to minimize stress and to assist a speedy recovery.18  
 
There is no standard of proof threshold in ordering an alternative form of evidence 
giving within the Evidence Act, nor is there a presumption favouring ‘normal’ 
forms of evidence giving within the courtroom. As stated in R v O, the Court of 
Appeal held that s 103 allows the court a “broad and unfettered discretion”19 when 
making an order for an alternative form of evidence. The court asserted that there 
is no default position or presumption leaning in favour of giving evidence the 
ordinary way, as the court has the flexibility to consider the case at hand, and are 
not limited to cases involving “young and mentally impaired complainants in 
sexual cases.”20  
 
Therefore the facts of each case must be considered before an order allowing an 
alternative form of evidence giving will be given. In deciding which route to take, 
the court must determine whether it would be fair to the proceedings.21 It is then 
up to the judge to decide whether to order the pre-recorded evidential interview to 




                                                 
17 Section 103(4)(a)-(c).  
18 Tinsley and McDonald, above n 7.  
19 R v O [2012] NZCA 475 at [37]. 
20 At [37]. 
21 R v Shone [2008] NZCA 313 at [28]. 
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B The current operation of s 106 
 
Section 106 of the Evidence Act 2006 deals specifically with the use of video 
evidence. If an evidential interview video record is to be offered as evidence in 
chief at the trial, s 106(4)(a) states the following: 
 
A copy of any video record that is to be offered as an alternative 
method of giving evidence in a proceeding— 
(a) must be given to the lawyer for each party before it is offered in 
evidence, unless the Judge directs otherwise; and 
(b) must be dealt with in accordance with any requirements set out in 
regulations made under s 201 concerning the custody or return of copies 
of video records, or prohibiting or restricting their copying.22 
 
In regulating the disclosure of video evidence to the defence, s 106(3) provides 
that if video evidence is to be used in court proceedings, then it must be offered to 
all parties and their lawyers, “unless the Judge directs otherwise.”23 The Law 
Society were concerned about this section during the 2005 reforms of the 
Evidence Bill, claiming that the privacy of the complainant was sufficiently 
protected by statutory regulations and the ethical stature of counsel.24 The Select 
Committee agreed that the Law Society does have a degree of responsibility to 
“maintain adequate standards for lawyers,” but they were aware of the potential 
breach of privacy on behalf of the complainant if the video evidence was 
misplaced. Due to this concern, the Select Committee recommended that strict 
regulations be created and enforced, to protect the complainant’s privacy and to 
                                                 
22 Section 106(4)(a). 
23 Section 106(3).  
24 Justice and Electoral Committee Evidence Bill (256-2) (24 October 2006) at 12.  
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create a structure that “governs the copying, custody and return of copies of video 
records.”25 These concerns have manifested themselves in s 201 of the Evidence 
Act 2006, and in the Evidence Regulations, 2007.  
 
Section 201 regulates the use of the video evidence, asking for the consent of the 
person who is being filmed, and prescribing the purpose for which the video is 
being used.26 Under the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, the prosecutor must 
disclose all relevant information to the defendant as soon as “reasonably 
practicable.”27 Section 29-34 of the Evidence Regulations 2007 specifically deals 
with the lawyer’s copy of the video evidence. Under s 30 of the Regulations, 
police make a copy of their video evidence and supply it to the defendant’s 
lawyer.28 Section 31 provides that the lawyer must keep the video evidence in 
“safe custody” and must return it to police “as soon as practicable after the 
criminal proceeding.”29 A lawyer cannot make a copy of the video evidence,30 and 
they can only use the video evidence when preparing their defendants criminal 
case.31 The protections encased in the Evidence Regulations and the Criminal 
Disclosure Act consequently serve to protect the complainant’s video evidence 
from being used inappropriately, or being broadcast to a wider class of persons.  
 
In 2010, the Law Society also expressed concerns about the workability of s 
106(4), claiming that police practice differed from the practice stipulated by s 
106(4)(a) of the Act. The Law Society reported that the police don’t always 
comply with s 106(4)(a), and deny copies of child complainant recordings to 
                                                 
25 At 12. 
26 Section 201. 
27 Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, s 13.  
28 Evidence Regulations 2007, reg 30. 
29 Reg 31.  
30 Reg 32. 
31 Reg 32.  
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defence counsel.32 The Law Commission responded by stating that they needed 
“further information” about the difficulties police were creating, to consider 
making changes to the regulations, to allow counsel for the defendant a copy of 
the recorded evidence.33  
 
V Cabinets reaction: Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 
 
Despite safeguards provided by the Criminal Disclosure Act and Evidence 
Regulations, the Cabinet Social Policy Committee issued the paper Amendments 
to the Evidence Act 2006 in November 2013. The suggested amendments 
presented by the Committee proposed restricting the defence’s access to the video 
records of complainants whose evidence is of a “sexual or violent nature, and of 
child victims’ evidence in all cases.” Therefore the evidence gathered during the 
initial interview with the police would not automatically find its way into the 
defence’s hands. Instead, the defence would get a transcript. If the defence wanted 
to view the video evidence, they would have to do so on police property, or at 
another place agreed upon by the parties. Alternatively, the defence could apply to 
the court for a copy if none of the above arrangements suited.34 
 
In addition, the Committee sought to make regulations prescribing offences for 
non-compliance, with a special emphasis on governing the safety of the video 
record. The maximum fine would be up to “$2,000 for an individual or up to 
$10,000 for an organisation.”35 The following would be an offence: 
 
                                                 
32 Richard Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2010). 
33 Mahoney and others, above n 32.  
34 Cabinet Social Policy Committee “Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006” (12 November 2013) at [50]. 
35 At [51]. 
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• Copy, distribute or exhibit a copy of the video record without 
authorisation, with a maximum penalty of a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding six months or a fine of $10,000 for an organisation; 
• Possess a video record without authorisation, having an intention to 
copy, distribute or exhibit the video record; with a maximum penalty of 
a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine of $10,000 
for an organisation; 
• Possess a copy of a video record without authorisation with a 
maximum penalty of a fine up to $2,000 for an individual and up to 
$10,000 for an organisation.36 
 
The Committee was particularly concerned about the risk of video records being 
exposed to the public or unauthorised persons. This risk was heightened by the 
videos being of vulnerable witnesses, which had the potential to fall into “the 
wrong hands” and be used for inappropriate purposes.37 A transcript of the 
interview was deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of the defence, thus 
decreasing the risk of sensitive information about the complainant and their case 
being misused.   
C Relevant case law 
 
The District Court case of R v Henning38 was a catalyst for reform and is the most 
well-known of its kind.39 The discussion around s 106 in Henning showcased the 
concerns of police, and reflect the concerns of the Cabinet Social Policy 
Committee. Both organisations were concerned about protecting vulnerable 
                                                 
36 Cabinet Social Policy Committee “Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006” (12 November 2013) at [52]. 
37 At [48].  
38 R v Henning, DC Wellington CRI-2010-078-1159, 5 July 2011.  
39 Tinsley and McDonald, above n 7. 
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witnesses. Ultimately, in Henning the judge had to consider the functionality of s 
106 if he were to rule in favour of the complainant. The complainant was 18, but 
at the time of the alleged offence, he was 17. For the purposes of the Evidence 
Act, he was a child. Thus s 107(1) was activated, and the Crown had to apply to 
the Court for direction about how the complainant would give evidence in chief 
and be cross-examined.40  The Crown sought to use the complainant’s recorded 
evidential interview for his evidence in chief, but the defence refused to comment 
“until the recording is seen by the defence.”41 The suggestion of viewing the video 
at a police station or Crown office was rejected.  
 
Consequently, the Crown sought direction from the court under s 106(4)(a). In 
situations where disclosure was not “in the interests of justice” the Crown argued 
that the Court has the power to restrict the defendant’s access to the video 
evidence, under s 106(4)(a).42 It was further argued that the Evidence Regulations 
2007 could not fully guarantee the complainant’s safety or anonymity, especially 
with the abundance of technology that allows easy distribution of such material.43 
Ultimately, it was argued that a copy of the transcript of the video evidence was 
sufficient for the defendant’s purposes. In the alternative, the Crown noted that it 
was not unheard of for defence counsel to view the video evidence at the Crown 
Solicitors office, or at a police station.44 
 
 
                                                 
40 At [1]. 
41 At [2]. 
42 At [9]. 
43 At [10]. 
44 At [22].  
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1 Concerns of police 
 
Nonetheless, two affidavits were entered by members of the police force, which 
reflect the concerns of the Cabinet Social Policy Committee. Detective Inspector 
Nina Westera was one of the police officers who entered an affidavit detailing the 
use of video evidence.45 Westera noted that prior to the Evidence Act 2006 being 
passed into law, the defence was only provided with a transcript of video evidence 
and could only view the video with their client under police direction. She 
claimed that since the Evidence Act, “there have been several instances involving 
potential misuse of such sensitive material.”46 Westera even noted that on one 
occasion, a defence lawyer lost their copy of the evidential interview containing 
reported violations of a sexual nature by a 9-year old complainant.47 Furthermore, 
the danger of providing video evidence to the defendant could undo the police’s 
hard work convincing victim support groups to support the use of video evidence. 
As Westera argues, all it would take to undo the agencies support for video 
evidence would be for one illegal release, perhaps on the internet.48  
 
Detective Senior Sergeant Neil Holden was the second police officer to swear an 
affidavit. His evidence was particularly influential as he held the National Co-
Ordinator position of Adult Sexual Assault and Child Abuse. He was particularly 
concerned about the wider societal effect in allowing the defence access to the 
recorded video evidence. He claimed that there is a likelihood of re-victimisation 
if the defendant ‘gets their hands on’ the evidence, as they can use it as a weapon 
                                                 
45 At [14]. 
46 At [14]. 
47 At [14]. 
48 At [15]. 
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in retaliation of being taken to court.49 Additionally, there was also the concern 
that vulnerable witnesses may not trust the criminal justice system to handle their 
case, and are therefore less likely to report it to the police if they know the 
defendant has access to their evidential interview later.50  
 
Despite the concerns voiced by the police, the judge in Henning held that if he 
were to agree with the Crown, he would essentially undermine the workability of 
s 106(4)(1). Considering the facts of the case, Mr Henning had no previous 
convictions and had interim name suppression. On this basis, Harrop J held that 
there was “considerably less reason in this case for the Court to be concerned 
about the risk of misuse than there may be in other cases.”51 Because Mr Henning 
had name suppression, misusing the video evidence and releasing it into the 
public, thus identifying himself as a sexual offender, would be detrimental to 
himself. This, coupled with the strict obligations of his defence lawyer to protect 
the evidential interview, made the risk of misuse very slim.52 
 
The concerns raised by Detective Inspector Nina Westera and Detective Senior 
Sergeant Neil Holden compliment and expand upon the concerns of the Cabinet 
Social Policy Committee. All are concerned with the perceived risk of the 
evidential video record being misused, thus breaching the complainants privacy 
and increasing the risk that other victims would not consent to an evidential 
interview with police, or go to police at all. This is particularly relevant in an age 
                                                 
49 At [18]. 
50 At [19]. 
51 At [28]. 
52 At [26]. 
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of accessible technology, where sensitive video information can be uploaded and 
downloaded with considerable ease off the internet.53  
 
VI The proposed reforms: Are they the correct response? 
 
Cabinets proposed changes to the Evidence Act were made in favour of 
vulnerable complainants, aiming to protect them while they are submitting 
sensitive information, and encouraging other victims of serious or sexual offences 
to report the crime to police. However this means that the defendant will not get 
immediate access to the footage. Mr Bott, for the defence in Henning, argued that 
they should have the right to take the video evidence away in order to build a 
proper defence.54 There are some doctrinal difficulties in restricting the 
defendant’s access to evidence regarding the case against them, and those are 
briefly discussed next.  
 
D Doctrinal considerations: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
 
The Cabinet Social Policy Committee concluded that there were no 
inconsistencies with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) because 
“the defence will be able to access a copy of the video when a court considers this 
to be necessary.”55 
 
Section 25 of BORA states the minimum standards of criminal procedure: 
 
                                                 
53 At [10]. 
54 R v Henning, above n 38.   
55 Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 3, at [60].  
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Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the 
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights-  
[...] 
(f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence under the 
same conditions as the prosecution.56  
 
Section 25(f) is based on article 14.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: 
 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall 
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language in which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing 
[...] 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under 
the same conditions as witnesses against him...57 
 
Article 6(3)(b) and (d) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
echoes these principles, emphasizing the importance of allowing the defence 
sufficient and proper facilities to prepare a defence.58 This idea is also 
                                                 
56 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(f). 
57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 14.3.  
58 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by 
Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
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characterised as the jurisprudential principle of equality of arms, which originated 
in the European Court of Human Rights and is regulated by article 6 of the 
ECHR.59 The doctrine stipulates that  both parties should have an equal 
opportunity to present their case in court, thereby discouraging any non-equal 
treatment between parties. An example of non-equal treatment would therefore be 
“sending only to the prosecutor and not also to the defence the police reports.”60 
 
The equality of arms doctrine has close ties to the notion of a fair trial. In New 
Zealand, Section 25 of BORA reflects the common law concept of a fair trial. It 
attempts no precise definition of a fair trial, and whether one has taken place is 
dependent on a factual inquiry.61 However, the overarching principle of fairness 
can be applied to the initial mechanisms of a trial, such as the giving and taking of 
evidence, as it contributes to the ‘quality’ of the trial process. It is the ‘quality’ of 
the trial that determines whether it is fair.62 Whereas for the notion of equality of 
arms, the European doctrine calls for adequate and fair procedural standards for 
both parties. The general principle is that parties disclose documents that they will 
use in court, as well as documents that may be detrimental to their case.63 Both 
parties should also exchange statements of the witnesses that they will call in trial 
in advance.64 On this basis, it appears that restricting the defendant’s access to the 
evidential interview of the complainant violates this European convention. The 
proposed amendments would not put both parties on an equal footing, as the 
prosecution does not declare the evidential interview to the defendant. The 
                                                 
59 Council of Europe, above n 58.  
60 Elisa Toma “The Principle of Equality of Arms- Part of the Right to a Fair Trial” (2011) 1(3) Romania Law Review 
1. 
61 Ministry of Justice The Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights and Freedoms 
in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector (Ministry of Justice, November 2004). 
62 Ministry of Justice, above n 61.  
63 Human Rights Review “Article 6: the Right to a Fair Trial” (2012) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/hrr_article_6.pdf>. 
64 Human Rights Review, above n 63.  
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defence would have to work harder to overcome the non-equal treatment, and 
would only be able to view the video on police premises, without an order from 
the judge. 
 
However, there has been some uncertainty over this principle of equality of arms 
and whether it is protected in either s 24 or s 25 of BORA. In R v Heemi, Chief 
Justice Eichelbaum held that it was not necessary to find an answer regarding the 
admissibility of the doctrine into BORA.65 Despite this, the doctrine is still 
applicable, because it allows for a balancing exercise; recognising that the concept 
of a fair trial is not rigid and absolute. This was highlighted in the case Fitt v 
United Kingdom,66 where the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
defendant’s right to be disclosed all relevant material of the prosecution’s case 
was not absolute. They recognized that in circumstances of competing interests, 
such as national security or the need to protect witnesses or police investigative 
methods, the complainant’s interests would be weighed against the defence’s 
interests.67 
 
The Canadian case R v O’Connor 68 also discusses the balance between a fair trial 
and the victim’s right to privacy and confidentiality. In this case, the defendant 
was accused of multiple sexual offences. The issue was whether the Crown could 
disclose the complainant’s medical, counselling and school records. In making 
this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the balance between the 
privacy and rights of the complainant, and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.69  
 
                                                 
65 R v Heemi CA143/98, 5 October 1998. 
66 Fitt v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 480. 
67 At [45]. 
68 R. v O'Connor, above n 8. 
69 At [32].  
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The majority in O’Connor held that a balancing exercise must be undertaken 
before an order for disclosure is made. This is because there is an assumption that 
disclosure of sensitive information to the defendant will not infringe upon the 
privacy of the complainant, because the judge will limit accessibility to the 
public.70 Therefore, the sensitive information is restricted initially for the 
defendant. Under this model, the balancing exercise occurs later.71 This balancing 
exercise occurs later, if the defence applies to the judge for a copy of the sensitive 
information. Only then will the rights of the complainant be balanced against the 
defence’s right to access all information easily for the sake of their case. The 
judge considered whether the record was necessary for the accused to make full 
answer and defence, alongside the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy and the extent to which production of records of this nature would 
frustrate society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and the 
acquisition of treatment by victims.72  
 
O’Connor gives a more detailed account of what a judge should consider when 
evaluating whether to disclose sensitive information to the defence. Under the 
proposed amendments to s 106, no such analysis is undertaken. Rather, the 
defendant is automatically restricted from obtaining the sensitive video 
information. Although the judge can decide later whether to make an order in 
favour of the defendant, and allow the evidential interview into the possession of 
the defendant, the balancing process as described in O’Connor between the 
interests of the complainants privacy and the interests of the defence is not 
conducted until later. Therefore the amendments to s 106 fall in favour of the 
complainant first, until the defendant challenges it.  
                                                 
70 At [32].  
71 At [32].  
72 At [156]. 
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In New Zealand, the case Attorney-General v Otahuhu District Council assessed 
whether O’Connor was persuasive in New Zealand. The Court held that it was not 
necessary to make a decision on whether the rights under New Zealand BORA 
should prevail over the common law doctrine of abuse of process, but believed 
that in the future, the rights exercised under BORA would be exclusively relied 
upon.73 The Court also reiterated that O’Connor held that the “mere failure to 
disclose material will not necessarily amount to a violation of the Charter right to 
make full answer and defence.”74 Although O’Connor dealt with sensitive 
information in the hands of third parties, the Court in Otahuhu District Council 
noted that the minority in O’Connor expanded this to sensitive information held 
by the Crown. Therefore, the criteria given by the majority regarding evidence 
held by third parties, can also be applied to Crown entities. The minority’s 
reasoning stipulated that not all Crown actions are justified, therefore the same 
criteria could be applied to the Crown.75  
 
Although the decision of O’Connor deals with sensitive information in the hands 
of third parties, the Canadian approach endorses a balancing exercise. In New 
Zealand, under the notion of a fair trial, a similar balancing exercise is conducted. 
The right to a fair hearing has been described as “the ultimate right from which all 
procedural rights could be deduced...Fairness in the criminal system is an 
imperative.”76 There is no doubt that the right to a fair trial is a protected right in 
New Zealand society, but the extent of such protection is debatable, especially 
                                                 
73 Attorney-General v Otahuhu District Court & Anor [2001] 1 NZLR 737 at [52]. 
74 At [53].  
75 At [55].  
76 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003).  
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when the idea of fairness must apply to both parties.77 Fairness is not an all 
enveloping concept for both parties: “fairness to the prosecution is not the same as 
fairness to prosecution witnesses.”78 From this perspective, it is difficult to see 
what a fair trial looks like, even though it is guaranteed under New Zealand 
BORA. The concept of a fair trial is not absolute, according to the Ministry of 
Justice, as it depends on the facts of the case. Furthermore, there is the proposition 
that the right to a fair trial is a limited right that changes with each case, to take 
into account the other parties rights and values, so that the accused “may have to 
accept something less than fairness.”79In Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-
General80 the Court of Appeal held that s 5 of BORA identifies the limits on the 
rights and freedoms contained in BORA, and that a balancing process needs to be 
undertaken by the Court to assess society’s values. As Richardson J stated, the 
right to a fair trial can be limited, justifiably, by other values.81    
 
In the Court of Appeal case R v Hines,82 Richardson P and Keith J refer to the 
ECHR and the ICCPR, stating that under the position of these international 
standards, the right of an accused to a fair trial is “subject to derogation.”83 The 
judges say that the fair trial provisions are not listed specifically in the non-
derogable articles of the ECHR or the ICCPR. They believe that this suggests the 
right to a fair trial is not absolute, “but may be qualified in the exceptional 
circumstances of a public emergency if strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.”84 Although an obiter point, this dicta shows that the notion of a fair 
trial is not to be used absolutely in every case. Situations may arise where it is just 
                                                 
77 Rishworth and others, above n 76.  
78 Don Mathias “The Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial: Absolute or Limitable?” (2005) 2 NZLR 217 at 217.  
79 Mathias, above n 78, at 218.  
80 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General [1995] 3 NZLR 563, 573.  
81 At 573.  
82 R v Hines (1997) 3 NZLR 529, 548 (CA).  
83 Mathias, above n 78, at 223.  
84 R v Hines, above n 82.  
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and fair to bend the concept and allow less fairness to the defence for the sake of 
the complainant. 
 
Amongst this dicta, there is room within s 24(d) and s 25(f) of BORA to allow for 
the proposed changes to s 106 of the Evidence Act. Under the proposed changes, 
the presumption of disclosure favouring the defence will be reversed. However, 
the trial will still remain fair to the accused, as a balancing mechanism is invoked: 
the rights of the defence and the rights of the vulnerable complainant are 
balanced. Even though the doctrine of equality of arms has not been incorporated 
into BORA, it too supports the contention that the right to a fair trial is not a rigid, 
absolute concept. 
 
In the case of a vulnerable complainant, the public interest arguably weighs in 
favour of restricting the defence’s access to the evidential video evidence, as it 
may result in a miscarriage of justice. If the defendant were to misuse the video 
evidence, or to lose it,85 this would most certainly amount to a miscarriage of 
justice. In the case of Hines, New Zealand judges have compared the ECHR and 
the ICCPR to the New Zealand BORA, and determined that they are alike in the 
sense that they appear to have enough room to incorporate this balancing exercise. 
The existence of s 5 in BORA appears to allow a limitation of the right to a fair 
trial, by providing that the rights and freedoms encased in the legislation “may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”86 It seems that there is a strong case in 
favour of vulnerable complainants, whose interests should be protected for the 
sake of preserving a free and democratic society, if the fairness of the trial for the 
                                                 
85 R v Henning, above n 38. 
86 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5.  
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defendant is not severely affected. Ultimately, the defence always receives a 
transcript of the video interview, and can apply to the judge for a copy of the 
video evidence. 
E Balancing the Rights of the Victim with the Rights of the Defence 
  
One of the main drivers for the Cabinet Social Policy Committee’s amendments 
was to protect the privacy and interests of the vulnerable witnesses, who were 
either children or alleged victims of a sexual or violent attack. The fast 
advancement of technology and media distribution puts the video evidence of the 
complainant at an even greater risk of being used inappropriately.  
 
The Ministry of Justice have recognised this issue and the potential impact the 
internet and other forms of media distribution technology can have on witnesses 
or victims. In a Regulatory Impact Statement entitled Harmful Digital 
Communications, the Ministry of Justice recognised that the internet provides a 
“unique forum” for harassment that is easy to create and distribute and is difficult 
to regulate.87 Therefore the effects of new communication technologies are more 
dangerous because they have the potential to be more intrusive, persuasive and 
can cause more harm than other, more traditional forms, of communication.88 
Providing a copy of the evidential interview for the defendant to view on police 
premises only, or by order of a judge, would decrease the possibility of the video 
evidence being released online.  
 
With this inherently more dangerous form of communication, the rights of the 
victim or witness must be carefully balanced against the defendant. As discussed 
                                                 
87Aphra Green Regulatory Impact Statement: Harmful Digital Communications (Ministry of Justice, 2013) at [11].  
88 Green, above n 87.  
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above, if s 25 of BORA is not met, there must be a sufficient reason in the name 
of fairness to let this breach occur. Protecting a vulnerable witness is recognised 
as a sufficient reason, but protecting victims rights should not encroach upon the 
defendants rights to a fair trial. In New Zealand, the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 
regulates the treatment of victims, clarifying that a victim has the right of privacy, 
as stipulated by the Privacy Act 1993.89 Victims can expect to be treated with 
“respect for your dignity and privacy and with courtesy and compassion.”90 
F Workability of amendments: do they address the current problem? 
 
Under the proposed amendments, questions arise over the practical workability of 
the changes, and whether they ‘live up’ to expectations. One of the expectations 
emitting from Cabinet when proposing the amendments was to protect the 
vulnerable complainant and simultaneously encourage more victims of sexual and 
violent offences to report to police. However, it is questionable whether restricting 
the defence’s access to the video evidence weighs substantially on the victims 
mind- so much so that it would deter them from reporting to the police. Therefore 
the key question is: are complainants really deterred by the prospect of their video 
evidence being viewed by the defendant? And furthermore, are they concerned 
about the video evidence reaching ‘the wrong hands?’ 
 
 
The report commissioned by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs Responding to 
sexual violence: Attrition in the New Zealand criminal justice system attempted to 
illuminate the issue of ‘victim withdrawal’ from the criminal justice system. The 
                                                 
89 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s 15.  
90 Ministry of Justice “A Guide to the Victims Charter” Ministry of Justice 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/v/victims-charter-booklet-a-guide-to-the-victims-
charter/documents/23510-Victims-Booklet-13-0.pdf> 
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report noted that victims withdrawing from the criminal justice procedure was a 
common event, especially when the alleged crime was one of sexual violence.91 
At least one in five cases withdraw before reaching an end in court, with victims 
not wanting to proceed or not co-operating with the investigation.92 30 per cent of 
victims recorded in the report “could not be contacted, refused to give incident 
details or refused to make a formal complaint after the initial report.”93 The 
remaining 70 per cent of cases were withdrawn at the victims request. For more 
than half of that 70 per cent, no reason was given for withdrawing. However, the 
remaining 139 cases gave an indication of what the police perceived to be the 
reason why the victim withdrew from the case. Amongst those reasons, the 
following were present: 
 
• The victim felt afraid or threatened  
• The victim felt like they couldn’t face the process 
• The victim was concerned about family reaction 
• The victim wanted to move on.94 
 
Due to the scope of the report, it was unclear whether the police investigation 
process played a role in the victim’s decision to withdraw their case. The victim’s 
reasons for withdrawing were broad, but mostly ranged between reluctance to go 
through the investigative or trial process, concern for others, fear of retribution or 
because they had elicited a negative response from police- either the police did not 
believe them, or the police had informed them about the low chance of 
                                                 
91 Triggs and others Responding to sexual violence: Attrition in the New Zealand criminal justice system (Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, September 2009).  
92 Triggs and others, n 91, at 49.  
93 At 49.  
94 At 50.  
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conviction.95 Withdrawn cases were “more likely than other cases to involve an 
offender who was an ex-partner or boyfriend.”96  
 
The negative aspects of the trial from the victim’s perspective has been well 
documented. So much so that judges and lawyers themselves sometimes advise 
victims against reporting sexual or serious offences, for the trauma of being a 
complainant is too great.97 Previous victims of sexual or violent offenses have 
detailed their participation in their own trial, labeling it “disgusting,” “degrading” 
and likening it to “being forced to have sex in front of a whole lot of people.”98  
The low conviction rate for rape is also a large deterrent for victims to report the 
offence to police, or to continue with the court process. Although research shows 
that around 20 per cent of girls have experienced some form of sexual violence,99 
only nine per cent of sexual offences are reported to the police.100  
 
A less documented reason as to why victims are reluctant to report a sexual or 
violent offence to the police, is the possibility of video evidence landing in the 
hands of the defence, or other party. During an evidential interview with the 
police, which is usually involves matters of a sexual or violent nature, a large 
number of victims stated that they were wary of revictimisation, in the sense that 
their private evidence would be played in trial.101 When their evidence was 
displayed or questioned in court, some felt that they were being held liable for 
                                                 
95 At 50.  
96 At 9.  
97 Elisabeth McDonald “Sexual Violence on Trial: Assisting Women Complainants in the Courtroom” (2005) 19(2) 
Women’s Studies Journal, 2005, 107, at 113.  
98 Venezia King and Jan Jordan Responding to Sexual Violence: Pathways to Recovery (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
Wellington, 2009) at 7.3.2. 
99 Ministry of Women’s Affairs “Dialogue on sexual violence” (1 May 2014) <http://mwa.govt.nz/news/dialogue-
sexual-violence>.  
100 Ministry of Women’s Affairs Restoring Soul: Effective Intervention for Adult Victim/Survivors of Sexual Violence 
(Ministry of Women’s Affairs, October 2009) at 1.3.  
101 Barbara Krahe and Jennifer Temkin Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008).  
Zoe Bennett  LAWS489 
29 
what happened to them.102 In Australia, a victim’s medical records, and even 
information about any counselling the complainant may have received, can be 
sought by the defence to undermine the credibility of complainants in sexual 
assault trials.103 It has been suggested that this knowledge causes a great deal of 
stress to the complainant or victim, and can lead to the complainant withdrawing 
their complaint.104 This discourse can be linked to the concerns of Cabinet 
regarding their proposed reforms, and to the concerns of Detective Senior 
Sergeant Neil Holden in Henning: that if complainants are concerned about their 
personal information being released to the defence and, in the worst case scenario, 
to the greater public, they are likely to refrain from reporting the offence, or are 
more likely to drop out of the criminal justice process altogether.  
  
But this fear of the complainants- of their video evidence making its way into the 
hands of the defence- cannot be considered in isolation. There are multiple factors 
affecting the complainant’s choice to report the sexual or violent offence to the 
police, not just the possibility of the video evidence being in the hands of the 
defence before the trial. For instance, complainants are more likely to be affected 
by the attitude of police toward their case, rather than their video evidence being 
presented to the defence. When the complainant first reports the offence, the 
initial contact with police is deemed the most crucial in deciding whether the 
victim wants to continue with their case or not.105 This stage of the investigative 
process is seen as a “critical determinant of whether complainants will be able to 
develop sufficient trust in the police to feel able to proceed with an 
                                                 
102 Krahe and Temkin, above n 101, at 41.  
103 Jennifer Temkin “Digging the Dirt: Disclosure of Records in Sexual Assault Cases” (2002) 61(1) The Cambridge 
Law Journal 126.  
104 Tinsley and McDonald, above n 7. 
105 Jan Jordan “Worlds Apart? Women, Rape and the Police Reporting Process” (2001) 41(4) Br J Criminol 679, at 688.   
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investigation.”106 Therefore the attitude of police and how they interact with the 
complainant paints a bigger picture as to why victims ‘drop out’ of the criminal 
justice process. The complainant’s view of the police, the attitude of police during 
the initial contact with the complainant, the reporting process, the medical 
examinations, the issue of disclosure- all can be reasons collectively or 
individually as to why complainants negate to report sexual or serious offences, or 
why they drop out of the criminal justice system prematurely.107 The issue of the 
video evidence being disclosed immediately and fully to the defence is therefore 
only one facet of a bigger problem. 
 
Adopting the proposed amendments into the Evidence Act would also affect the 
defence’s use of video evidence. As Mr Bott described in Henning, the defence’s 
routine would be disrupted by the proposed amendments, as they would not be 
able to study the video evidence when it best suited them. Mr Bott said that he 
would rather study the evidential video interview in “his chambers and at time that 
suits him, which probably would be later in the evening after a busy day in 
Court.”108 By amending the Evidence Act, a defence lawyer would have to visit 
police premises  or Crown premises to view the evidential interview, or view it at 
another specified place.109 Mr Bott submitted that this would be unreasonable to 
expect defence counsel to do this, especially when they would want to revisit 
evidence multiple times.110  
 
Although the new amendments would restrict the ability of the defence to ‘have 
the evidence in their hands,’ the evidence is still accessible, albeit not on their 
                                                 
106 Jordan, above n 105, at 688.  
107 Jordan, above n 105, at 688.  
108 R v Henning, above n 38, [23]. 
109 Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 3.  
110 R v Henning, above n 38, [23]. 
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terms. The weighing exercise as described in O’Connor, the New Zealand BORA 
literature, and the equality of arms doctrine weighs in favour of protecting the 
privacy and security of the vulnerable witnesses. The loss incurred to defendant 
does not equate to the potential loss to the complainant if their video evidence 
were to be misplaced. Already there have been cases of video evidence being 
misused, and lost.111 Therefore, the privacy of the victim outweighs the defence’s 
concerns about not having a copy of the evidential interview ‘in their hands,’ as it 
is still generally accessible in order to construct a defence. 
  
VII  Conclusion 
 
Although it is unclear whether the doctrine of equality of arms is facilitated under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, it sets out what is expected of parties 
regarding disclosure. The defence, under this doctrine, is entitled to full and 
timely disclosure of all material relevant to the case, to construct a fair and viable 
defence. However, this must be balanced against the vulnerable witnesses rights. 
This, in conjunction with the prevalence of new technology and the dangers 
associated with uploading and downloading media, concerned Cabinet and drove 
their proposed amendments.  
 
Cabinet’s proposals were created in good faith; their aim was to protect vulnerable 
witnesses from the harshness of the courtroom. Although the proposed 
amendments overlook other reasons why vulnerable witnesses are apprehensive of 
the criminal justice system, they seek to eliminate a small class of witnesses who 
drop out of the criminal justice system because they are afraid of their video 
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evidence falling into the hands of the defence. However small this class may be, it 
still outweighs the detriment suffered by the defence, through restricting their 
access to the complainants video evidence. Three obvious safeguards would still 
exist to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial if these amendments were to be 
adopted. First, the defence would receive a full transcript of the video interview. 
A transcript contains the entire interview between the police and the complainant. 
Second, the defence can view the video evidence on police premises. Although 
this may interrupt the daily life of defence counsel, it is inaccurate to state that the 
defendant’s rights have been extinguished by determining where the video 
evidence is to be viewed. Finally, the defence can still apply to the judge for a 
copy of the video evidence. In circumstances where limiting the defence’s access 
to the video evidence would severely disadvantage the defence, the judge would 
be expected to give them a copy. Therefore, in extreme cases, we can rely on the 
judge to balance the complainant’s right to privacy with the defence’s right to a 
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